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IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040701-CA
vs.
MITCHELL WORWOOD,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cory Wright lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood in this case as
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, a wet spot and a partially crushed beer can laying on a
road do not constitute reasonable articulable facts that a crime has been or is about to be
committed. There are many reasons unrelated to criminal conduct why a person might
have bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Further, there were no objective facts to suggest
that Mr. Worwood was impaired, such as the smell of alcohol, body sway or an impaired
driving pattern. Therefore, based on the totality of these circumstances, Officer Wright
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood.
Even assuming arguendo that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the level
two stop, Mr. Worwood was then unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The facts
of this case constitute an arrest under both federal and state law. Because there was no

probable cause to arrest, the level three detention was unlawful and all evidence obtained
thereby must be suppressed.
The detention of Mr. Worwood in this case was also unlawful because the
officer's decision to take Mr. Worwood into custody and transport him to another location
so as not to "mess up" the officer's night, was not a diligent means of investigation likely
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions of impairment quickly. Moreover, it was not
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, as the officer testified that he could have
conducted field sobriety tests at the scene but he chose not to.
The evidence in this case, particularly the field sobriety and intoxilizer test
results, were obtained as a direct result of the unlawful arrest. Therefore, that evidence so
obtained should be suppressed as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION.

It is undisputed in this case that Mr. Worwood was not free to leave once Cory
Wright noticed his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech (R92:13-15). However, Cory
Wright lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood. "While reasonable suspicion
is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably
less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000). An officer's reasonable suspicion must be based on "unusual conduct"
2

strongly suggestive of criminal activity. State v Rodriguez-LopU 954 P.2d 1290, 1293
(Utah App. 1998). Finally, whether there are objective facts sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Provo City v Warden,
844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992), aff d, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994).
As applied here, a wet spot on a road is not evidence of intoxication. It also
cannot be concluded from one or even several beer cans that a person possessing them is
intoxicated. See, State v Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining that
a car cluttered with beer cans and defendants5 bloodshot eyes did not indicate criminal
activity). In this case, a partially crushed beer can laying on a public road cannot even
be tied to Mr. Worwood. Further, it is well settled in Utah that bloodshot eyes are
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated. Id. ("And
while bloodshot eyes can indicate the presence of drugs or alcohol, they are equally
indicative of dust in one's eyes or lack of sleep.5'). It is also not uncommon for slurred
speech to be a person's normal speech pattern (see, Beck v Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1343
(Utah 1979), or to be the result of an involuntary medical condition unrelated to
intoxication (see, Elton v Bankers Life & Casualty Co ,30 Utah 2d 213, 215 (Utah
1973)).
Cory testified that he stopped initially because there was a "big wet spot on the
road and then there was a beer can15 (R92:5). Cory suspected that Mr. Worwood had been

dumping water out of a cooler because of the size of the wet spot (R92:6).1 Further, and
contrary to the State's representation of the facts, Cory did not detect any odor of alcohol
until after he took Mr. Worwood into custody and placed him into Cory's truck. As Cory
testified, it was at that point that he first detected the odor of alcohol and "I know it
wasn't coming from my vehicle . . ." (R92:9). In short, Cory determined solely from Mr.
Worwood's speech and the appearance of his eyes either that Mr. Worwood had been
drinking "or there was something wrong" (R92:13). By his own testimony, there were no
other facts that Cory relied upon when he determined Mr. Worwood was not allowed to
drive and that he would transport Mr. Worwood to Cory's personal residence, where
another officer would be summoned to perform field sobriety tests (R92:14). There were
no facts to suggest Mr. Worwood was impaired.
Although Mr. Worwood entered his vehicle and drove it a short distance to move
it off the road, Cory Wright noticed no body sway or driving pattern to suggest Mr.
Worwood was intoxicated, nor did Cory detect the odor of alcohol until after he took Mr.
Worwood into custody (R92:9). Cory decided to detain Mi*. Worwood for further
investigation based solely upon his purported slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a wet spot
on the road, and a partially crushed beer can laying nearby on the road (R92:12, 13).

l

Both the trial court and the State incorrectly assume there was an empty cooler.
There is nothing in the record to support this assumption. Although Mr. Worwood's
vehicle was never inventoried, Cory testified that he later found a cooler filled with ice
and some alcohol (R92:6, 13).
4

Further, Cory determined that Mr. Worwood had been drinking solely from his speech
and the appearance of his eyes (R92:13).
Based on the totality of these circumstances and the law cited above, these facts
are insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion and to justify the detaining of Mr.
Worwood in this case.
II

THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE EXCEEDED A LEVEL TWO
STOP AS MR. WORWOOD WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE.

The dispositive issue in this case is whether Mr. Worwood was arrested without
probable cause, and therefore, whether all evidence seized as a result of that unlawful
arrest should be suppressed. The State does not directly argue the fact that Cory lacked
probable cause to arrest Mr. Worwood when he was placed in Cory's vehicle.2 The State
merely argues that this was a level two encounter and an appropriate investigative
detention rather than an arrest. The State is wrong, as the law herein will demonstrate.
The test as to whether a seizure occurs is objective. A seizure occurs if "in view
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." United State's v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). The objective of the inquiry is

2

The State does suggest in a footnote that there might have been probable cause to
arrest Mr. Worwood on the basis of slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the odor of
alcohol. However, as noted herein, Mr. Worwood was taken into custody before the
officer detected any odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the precedent relied upon by the State
does not apply here.
5

to deduce whether the defendant remained in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's
investigation or believed that he was not free to go. State v Trnjillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87
(UtahApp. 1987).
The facts in this case constitute an arrest under federal law. A de facto arrest
occurs when the events that occur during a detention are indistinguishable from an arrest.
See, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (explaining that the taking of a
murder suspect to the police station for investigative purposes, where he confessed after
one hour of interrogation, was not merely an investigative detention, but was an arrest, as
these events were indistinguishable from an arrest). This case is similar to those in
Dunaway, as the officer's refusing to let Mr. Worwood drive, placing him in the officer's
personal vehicle, and transporting him to the officer's personal residence are
circumstances indistinguishable from an arrest.
The facts in this case also constitute an arrest under State law. As previously
noted in Mr. Worwood's opening brief, "an arrest is an actual restraint of the person
arrested or submission to custody." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-1. Under this controlling
statute, Mr. Worwood was undisputably arrested. He was placed in the officer's personal
vehicle without resistance - he was both restrained and submitted himself to custody.
The taking of Mr. Worwood into custody, not allowing him to drive his truck,
and transporting him to another location, was highly intrusive and clearly constitutes a
level 3 encounter, or in other words, an arrest, under Utah Code Ann. §77-7-1 and State v.

6

Hansen, 837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992).3 Mr. Worwood was told he could not drive
until another trooper looked at him, and he was not free to leave (R92:13-15). Further.
the events of this encounter were indistinguishable from an arrest. As this Court
explained, a level two encounter is brief and nonintrusive, where a level three encounter
"involves an arrest, which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy
detention that requires probable cause. A level three encounter is also a Fourth
Amendment seizure." Id. at 661 (emphasis added). This fact is dispositive to Mr.
Worwood's appeal, as all evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be
suppressed.
III.

OFFICER WRIGHT DID NOT PURSUE A MEANS OF
INVESTIGATION LIKELY TO CONFIRM OR DISPEL HIS
SUSPICIONS QUICKLY.

Contrary to the State's brief, there is nothing in the facts to suggest that the
scene of the stop in this case was an unsuitable location to perform field sobriety tests.
Also, notwithstanding the fact that the taking of Mr. Worwood into custody without
probable cause constituted an unlawful arrest, Cory Wright's actions further exceeded the

3

The State cites multiple cases where courts have held that moving the defendant
to a separate location did not constitute an arrest. BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.")
at 18-20. There are two obvious problems with the State's use of these cases which the
State does not address. First, inapposite to the facts here, not one cased cited by the State
suggests that the transporting of the defendant was done for officer convenience rather
than necessity. Second, under the plain language of the controlling Utah statutory
provision, Mr. Worwood was arrested, as he had at least submitted himself to custody.
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-1.
7

scope of a level two stop because he did not diligently pursue a means of investigation
likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
686 (1985) (uwe have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to
be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes."
Id at 685 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)).4
This fact is illuminated by Cory's own testimony that he pursued a means of
investigation that catered to his personal whims and convenience, and that would not
require him to make an arrest when he was off-duty and thereby "mess up" his night.
Therefore, assuming arguendo that the officer involved had a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Worwood was impaired and a level two stop was justified, the next
question is what course of action was then reasonable and likely to confirm or dispel the
officer's suspicions quickly. This is a question of necessity, not of convenience. Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining that the detention "must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.") (emphasis added).
In this case, this mandate translates into a conclusion that the officer should have
taken the 2-3 minutes to perform field sobriety tests at the scene. It was simply not
necessary to take Mr. Worwood into custody and transport him to a different location to
perform field sobriety tests, as Cory admitted during his testimony (R92:l 1,14,15).

4

Thus, the central query is not the length of the detention, as the State seems to
suggest, but the diligence of the officer in pursuing a means of investigation likely to
confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly.
8

Therefore, what the State is really asking this Court to do here is to expand the
bases of an investigative detention from what is necessary to what is convenient.3
Moreover, the State is asking this Court to justify a level three encounter, i.e., an arrest, to
avoid having an officer's night "messed up" by the inconvenience of performing field
sobriety tests when he is off duty.
The State's position effectively supports a holding that a person may be taken
into custody without probable cause. If an officer is qualified, but is not inclined to
conduct field sobriety tests for reasons of mere personal convenience as established by the
record in this case (R92:l 1, 14, 15),6 the State takes the position that the officer's
convenience takes precedence over the large volume of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

5

The State speculates that Cory Wright did not have his side-arm, handcuffs, etc.
because he was off-duty. Not only is there no evidence to support this speculation, but it
is directly contrary to Cory's testimony that he chose not to follow through with the
investigation and possible subsequent arrest because it would have "messed up" his night
(R92:11). Moreover, an officer is not required to have handcuffs, a sidearm, or his patrol
vehicle in order to conduct an arrest.
6

Q.

A.

- did you perform any field sobriety tests at that point?
No, no. I've got my experience and training - because I was off duty I
didn't - 1 didn't want to - you know it would have messed up my night so I
wanted another officer to come and do those because such I did not, so -

j|e sje ^« ^« ^c

Q.

And prior to taking him into cust - or prior to taking him in your truck into
custody you could have performed field sobriety tests, correct?

A.

Well, yeah, I guess I could but 9

that requires law enforcement to diligently pursue a means of investigation that does not
exceed the scope of necessity. Therefore, the element of "'reasonableness" may turn on
officer preference. As demonstrated herein, this is not the law.
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that Mr. Worwood was
arrested without probable cause, and the officer did not pursue a means of investigation
necessary and likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions of impairment quickly.
Accordingly, all evidence seized as a result of that unlawful de facto arrest, including but
not necessarily limited to field sobriety and intoxilizer test results, should be suppressed.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
UNLAWFUL ARREST IN THIS CASE MUST BE SUPPRESSED
AS "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE."

In light of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence directly on point, it seems
disingenuous for the State to argue that no evidence was obtained via the unlawful arrest
of Mr. Worwood. See, Br. Appe. at 22. The contrary should be obvious. "Evidence
obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to
exclusion. The question to be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently
obtained is 'tainted' or is 'fruit5 of a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence
was 'come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.5 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
804 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
In this case, the evidence against Mr. Worwood was obtained as a direct result of

10

the unconstitutional seizure discussed herein. The State cites United States v. IbarraSanchez, 203 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) as helpful to its position that the test
results in this case were not obtained via the unlawful seizure of Mr. Worwood.
However, the facts in Ibarra-Sanchez are distinguishable from this case.
The issue in Ibarra-Sanchez revolved around the search of a van after its
occupants were purportedly unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The van was
legally stopped on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The defendants were then removed
from the van, handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle, during which contact the police
detected the odor of marijuana in the van. The defendants sought to have the marijuana
subsequently found in the van suppressed.
The court determined the officers had probable cause to search the van irrespective of the unlawful seizure of its occupants because they smelled marijuana in the van.
As the court concluded, the officers would have discovered the marijuana pursuant to a
lawful search whether the defendants were still in the vehicle, standing on the road, or
handcuffed in police vehicle. Id. In short, the van was lawfully searched because the
odor of marijuana gave the officers probable cause. However, the result in IbarraSanchez would have been different had the officers found evidence as a direct result of
the unlawful arrests, as in this case.7 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 484.

Tor example, had the officers searched the defendants' persons incident to arrest
and found contraband, or had contraband been discovered on the defendants' persons
pursuant to a more thorough search at booking, that evidence would clearly have been
11

The facts in this case are not similar in any way to those in Ibarra-Sanchez.
Here, the issue is whether the officer exploited the unlawful arrest and thereby obtained
evidence, i.e. the results of the field sobriety and intoxilizer tests. This evidence was
directly obtained as a result of Mr. Worwood being taken into custody and transported to
Cory Wright's home. This scenario is no different from a case where a defendant is
arrested without probable cause and drugs are found on his person pursuant lo a search
incident to arrest. Clearly, this evidence is fruit of the prior illegality of the unlawful
arrest, and as such, it must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, Mitchell Worwood, respectfully requests this Court to hold that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and thereby vacate his conviction in
this case.
Respectfully submitted this

/

^

day of June, 2005.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Scott B/Card
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

suppressed under the Fourth Amendment as >;fruit of the poisonous tree." Id
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